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Introduction 
Research uptake: For the purposes of this report we will define uptake as the 
acknowledgement and use of evidence-based learning by those key stakeholders who we 
want to influence (i.e. whose behaviour or attitudes we are seeking to change). 
 
The overarching purpose of the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme (AMV) is to 
generate useful analysis to tackle policy dilemmas relating to ‘newer’ forms of violence and 
organised crime. Across the contexts where we work, we will undertake a multi-level 
governance analysis with a multi-actor governance approach to better understand the 
contributions and possibilities for convergence between state and non-state stakeholder 
efforts in different policy spaces. An important goal of work across the AMV theme will be to 
increase the capabilities of partners and stakeholders in each of the contexts where we work 
to identify more effective ways of policy influence. 
 
The Year One work focused on the two following sub-themes. 
 
1. Strengthening core state functions and citizen agencies to mitigate and prevent 
routine forms of violence, as well as organised violence and crime (Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone). 
2. Improving access to livelihoods, jobs and basic services in violent contexts, including 
in large urban settings (Maharashtra, India and Nairobi, Kenya). 
 
The strategy is a working document that reflects uptake as an ongoing process which is 
responsive to emerging policy opportunities, learning and partnership activities. As the AMV 
programme progresses through years two to four, the strategy will be continually updated 
and strengthened through incorporating new approaches to knowledge uptake and 
dissemination based on ongoing learning. 
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1 Developing the uptake strategy 
The development of the uptake strategy was an iterative process involving case study leads 
(IDS), partner organisations (in-country), IDS staff from Knowledge Services, 
Communications and the Impact Innovation strand of the Accountable Grant. The process 
was adapted from the Participatory Impact Pathways Analysis (PIPA) – ensuring a coherent 
approach across the case studies. 
 
The core process involved envisaging and identifying the key actors in relation to influencing 
policy; their networks; their information needs (where they currently source information and 
the preferred format and language for programme outputs); and upcoming critical policy 
events and opportunities. This information enables us to produce targeted, relevant 
information for our key audiences. 
 
The process revealed a set of common audiences at the global level; ‘crossover’ at the 
African regional level; and opportunities to link the programme of work with ongoing IDS 
research and communication activities in this field – enabling us to present a strong body of 
knowledge on newer forms of violence and organised crime. In contrast the unique social, 
political and economic contexts of each country-level study require tailored strategies for 
dissemination and engagement in order to target our policy messages and reach and 
influence the relevant stakeholders. 
 
This document first details the specific country-level uptake strategies then presents a 
common approach to global communication and dissemination activities. 
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2 Partnering principles 
IDS collaborated with in-country organisations in each of the case studies. Working with 
partners is a core part of IDS’ approach to policy analysis activities across the Accountable 
Grant. Partnership is essential both to produce knowledge that is relevant and grounded and 
improve its communication and uptake. IDS recognises that work with partners should create 
opportunities to understand each other’s strategic goals and interests; for dialogue, shared 
learning and knowledge exchange; for mutual capacity development and for knowledge co-
construction. 
 
However, partnering is a complex and negotiated process mediated by human relationships, 
access to resources, and skills. Therefore, the ways in which we approach and manage our 
relationships with partners should be based on a realistic assessment of different values and 
interests that come into play, as well as the complexities of building relationships in 
circumstances where power is often shared unequally. Imbalances of power may, for 
example, arise as a result of the ways that funding flows and how this structures 
accountability relations; through differences in resource access; and through differences in 
authority and voices of partners in various spaces. 
 
Partners will have a wide set of experiences, motivations and expectations of partnering. It is 
important to account for these, as well as the different ways of working. At a practical level, 
working with partners is constrained or enabled by the structures, reach, capacity and 
reputation of the partnering institutions (including IDS), as well as by the sociopolitical 
conditions within which partners are embedded. At the outset, IDS and its partners should 
together come to a clear understanding of how partners can engage, what they can offer, 
what they need and how they see the work supporting or complementing their own strategic 
goals and interests. This will help to define clear expectations and, it is hoped, promote a 
sense of collective ownership of work that is undertaken. 
 
Targeted uptake activities, led by partner organisations, can deepen and extend policy 
influence because partners have a grounded understanding of the formal and informal 
relationships that shape policy processes in their country; they have their own in-country 
networks that can be consulted to deepen and widen engagement with national and sub-
national policy stakeholders. Thus, whilst arguably a complex process, partnering has clear 
perceived benefits for the quality of knowledge, its impact on policy processes and the 
outcomes of these, particularly in the local context. 
 
Work on issues of violence and insecurity means additional constraints are often manifest in 
the context of the study itself. Analysis of violence, its causes and its many forms can put 
researchers, partners and other stakeholders at considerable institutional and/or personal 
risk. The particular policy setting – characterised by fluidity, uncertainty and insecurity – may 
also limit the ability of in-country partners to exert influence and promote consideration of 
policy evidence locally. It is critical to be aware of and responsive to the particular 
sensitivities experienced by local partners; this may be through appropriate use (or not) of 
logos, seeking alternative actors to promote policy analysis or by IDS assuming a greater 
role in taking on the role of independent international voice. 
 
Whilst recognising that each context and relationship will be unique there is a need for IDS 
to apply some common principles to the way in which we partner in the AMV theme. By 
committing to a common set of principles for partnering, the AMV theme is seeking to: 
 
 value relationships with partners beyond the specific programme(s) of work under the 
Accountable Grant; 
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 engender and build trust through sensitive partnering;  
 create opportunities for dialogue and negotiation of the different interests and views 
of DFID, IDS and local partners. 
 
2.1 Partnering in the context of the Accountable Grant 
The Accountable Grant poses both challenges and opportunities for working with partners. 
The somewhat pre-determined nature of the case studies, the pre-defined outputs, and set 
of intended outcomes and indicators, limits the scope for generating a shared problem 
framing with partners, for identifying alternative and potentially more appropriate products or 
engagement strategies for uptake and influencing, and emphasises IDS’ upward 
accountability. However, the multi-year nature of the programme provides a platform for IDS 
to build on and deepen relationships with existing partners, and explore relationships with 
new partners and actors in the areas in which it works. In addition, it provides DFID the 
opportunity to engage with new stakeholders. 
 
The following principles will guide how IDS approaches partnership in the AMV theme. 
 
1. We will be TRANSPARENT in communications with our partners. In particular, being 
clear about the pre-existing commitments (to DFID) and constraints within the 
existing programme framing and funding. We will also be transparent on our own 
agenda and positioning in the programme. 
 
2. We will ensure there is CLARITY of roles, of named IDS staff and partners, the 
expected inputs and deliverables from IDS and partners and the timelines involved. 
We will keep open channels of communication to discuss any possible changes to 
the timing, expectations or deliverables of the work. 
 
3. We will be SENSITIVE to partners’ motivations, interests, goals and constraints in 
working with IDS. We will seek to understand each other and ensure that work is 
complementary and contributes to partner agendas. In addition, we will work to 
minimise any exposure to increased personal or reputational risk. 
 
4. We will VALUE and respect partners’ networks and connections recognising that 
partners have influence and approach influence in different ways. 
 
5. We will be FLEXIBLE in managing difference. We will engage in dialogue throughout 
our shared project work to understand and manage difference in working cultures, 
language, and access to resources. 
 
6. We will take a SHARED LEARNING approach to knowledge generation, valuing 
partners’ different knowledge framings, perspectives and ideas, and being 
responsive by seeking to re-negotiate programme framings and understandings. 
 
7. We will be PROACTIVE in establishing or extending our relationships as a basis for 
longer term interactions. We will seek to create opportunities for wider learning and 
knowledge exchange beyond the confines of the specific project(s) and build a 
shared understanding of personal and institutional skills, complementarities and 
goals. 
 
8 We will aim to IMPROVE our understanding about how we learn with others, and 
how we partner. We will seek to better understand where and how we can add value 
in the partnering process and how we can foster ‘good’ partnering behaviour by 
seeking feedback informally. 
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3 Country uptake strategies 
Each country case study has the following three pre-determined outputs. 
 
 Main country case study report (10,000 words). 
 A Summary Brief (1–2 page summary of the main report). 
 Policy Brief synthesising case studies under each sub-theme (2–4 pages). 
 
These outputs will be targeted at respective key audiences within each case study. In 
addition, other ‘knowledge products’ have been developed, such as audio-visual material, as 
part of respective country case study outputs which will enable uptake amongst key 
audiences to which such a format is appropriate. 
 
The gathering of audio-visual content by members of the case study teams will also help to 
expand the reach and access of the knowledge generated to a wider set of audiences and 
which can complement the formal outputs. Work on these products is supported by in-
country partners or by the IDS Knowledge Services and Communications staff. In all cases 
the teams are also committed to writing blogs and news items for dissemination through 
existing IDS networks and channels, as well as working with partners to reach the national 
and local media. 
 
3.1 Sub-theme 1 
Strengthening core state functions and citizen agencies to mitigate and prevent routine 
forms of violence, as well as organised violence and crime 
 
3.1.1 Nigeria case study 
Background 
The current political (elite) settlement in Nigeria, which is centred on the access to, and 
distribution of, massive oil rents, blocks chances to address the underlying causes of conflict 
and violence in the Niger Delta. The region was pacified by the 2009 presidential amnesty 
and the DDR programme. There is less actual violence today than 3–4 years ago but the 
situation is unstable and the potential for serious violence to flare up again persists. Restive 
Delta youths and former foot soldiers of the militant groups are not being reintegrated into 
society and continue to face serious problems of unemployment, marginalisation and 
poverty. They are also being drafted into criminal organisations and militant groups that did 
not demobilise and which play a significant role in the rising business of illegal oil bunkering 
and trafficking. Further, the Joint Task Force of the Nigerian military continues to violate 
human rights and reportedly some of its officers participate in illegal oil bunkering, as do 
other elite groups at the local, state and federal levels. 
 
Hence, in past years Nigeria has seen the broadening of its political settlement through the 
inclusion and co-optation of Niger Delta militant and criminal leaders, as well as state 
governors and likely community leaders who are benefiting from the increased oil revenue 
derivation that was established under the first ‘democratic’ government of President 
Obasanjo in 1999/2000; 13 per cent of revenue is now channelled back to the oil-bearing 
states from the federal account. Yet this broadening of the political settlement has not 
resulted in opening up space to address the grievances and socioeconomic problems and 
community/ethnic tensions in the Niger Delta. What has been achieved is the temporary 
pacification of the Niger Delta elites, including the militant and some criminal leaders, 
through a strategy of buying them off. This is an unstable equilibrium which can easily turn 
violent again, particularly if funds stop flowing or some elites feel that they are being short-
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changed. Reaching this equilibrium has been helped by the fact that President Jonathan is 
from the Delta, but equally the equilibrium is challenged by the northern Nigerian elites of 
Muslim faith. Therefore, the Delta equilibrium is presently unstable. 
 
President Jonathan’s term will last until 2015 and it is to be expected that there will be heavy 
pressures from the North to ensure that he is succeeded by a northern president. This 
means there is relatively little time left for Jonathan to accomplish his objectives of cleaning 
up and modernising the country’s oil sector, as exemplified by the establishment of the 
Petroleum Revenue Task Force in early 2012. It is impossible to say whether this more 
progressive agenda, which clearly is at odds with some big interests in the oil industry 
(including criminal interests linked to oil bunkering), would be held up by a northern 
government or indeed any other future Nigerian government. 
 
Ideal situation 
Ideally, the expanded political settlement that has been described above and which has a 
number of highly problematic features will be fundamentally changed in the sense that if 
other progressive elite groups – from the Delta, the Middle Belt and the North, that is, from 
across the country and all main ethnic-religious groups – are included and gain a seat and 
the upper hand in the negotiations between Nigerian elites on how the oil rents are to be 
distributed and invested, not for particularistic economic gain but for the common good. In 
addition, powerful groups at all levels of political authority that are currently blocking a more 
just, equitable and poverty-reducing distribution of oil rents, including militant and criminal 
leaders, as well as some elites at the federal, state and local levels, will, ideally, be 
separated from the political settlement and held in check by means of the democratic 
process and the rule of law. This process of changing the existing, problematic political 
settlement would take place at all levels of political authority (from local to federal), and 
would also include the multinational oil majors. They will support it fully and make all 
necessary concessions in terms of increasing the transparency of their operations and 
accountability vis-à-vis the Nigerian government and authorities, as well as accepting the 
inevitable financial losses. 
 
A new, pro-development and decriminalised political settlement will provide opportunities to 
increase governance capacities at all levels of political authority which, in turn, will enable 
the design and implementation of effective public policies to address socioeconomic 
grievances (such as youth unemployment, environmental destruction, and failing/absent 
social services, poverty), the public security gap and the problem of the privatisation of 
violence, the failure of the reintegration of militant fighters, and spreading crime (including 
illegal oil bunkering) in an integrated manner. 
 
In sum, the new political settlement will enable Nigeria to address the underlying causes of 
(potential) violence in the Delta and beyond by allowing an increasing number of progressive 
elites at all levels of political authority, who have an interest in using the country’s oil wealth 
for development and the common good, to strengthen governance capacity and effectively 
deliver public goods and services. 
 
Changes (in practice, knowledge, attitude, skill, policy) that contribute towards 
achieving project vision 
 
1. An awareness of the need to strengthen governance at all levels in Nigeria, that is, at 
the local, regional and federal levels, especially in the Niger Delta. 
 
2. Recognition of the need to seriously tackle organised crime, corruption, and 
addressing the socioeconomic root causes of violence in the Niger Delta. 
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3. Improved ability to advocate and influence key stakeholders on the issues. 
 
4. Recognition of the need to reform the post-1999 ‘oil-centred political settlement’ 
through the inclusion of additional actors and the strengthening of governance at all 
levels, especially in the Niger Delta. 
 
Table 3.1 Target audience, desired change and channels of influence 
(Nigeria) 
 
Audience group Changes 
needed 
(1–4 above) 
Project strategy 
(how are actors 
involved/ 
mobilised?) 
Output (in line 
with 
information 
needs) 
Events, 
opportunities and 
dissemination 
channels 
Federal 
government and 
political elites 
 
1, 2, and 4 Invited to 
participate in 
roundtable 
 
 
Receive and share 
project outputs 
(Mar/Apr 2013) 
 
Summary Brief Had follow-up 
conversation with 
senior political 
advisor to President. 
Local NGO partner in 
discussions with 
Election 
Commission. 
State-level 
governments and 
political elites in 
the Niger Delta 
1, 2, and 4 Summary Brief Utilise connections/ 
contact from 
roundtable. 
Local 
governments and 
community 
leaders in the 
Niger Delta 
1, 2, and 4 Summary Brief 
Blog 
Utilise connections/ 
contact from 
roundtable. 
Domestic/Delta-
based militant 
leaders and 
heads of criminal 
organisations 
1, 2, 3 and 4  
 
 
Invited to 
participate in 
roundtable 
 
 
Receive and share 
project outputs 
(Mar/Apr 2013) 
 
Summary Brief Utilise connections/ 
contact from 
roundtable. 
Multinational oil 
companies 
1 and 2 Summary Brief 
Blog 
Follow-up 
conversation with 
official from Agip. 
Delta CSOs 1, 2, 3 and 4 Summary Brief 
Blog 
Utilise connections/ 
contact from 
roundtable. 
Maintain active email 
contact. 
INGOs/regional 
bodies/networks 
1, 2, 3 and 4 Summary Brief 
Blog 
Main report 
Utilise connections/ 
contact from 
roundtable. 
Maintain active email 
contact with a 
number of 
organisations. 
IDS and Eldis 
channels. 
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Donors – 
particularly DFID 
1 and 2 Summary Brief. 
Blog. 
Main report. 
Utilise connections/ 
contact from 
roundtable. 
IDS and Eldis 
channels. 
 
Table 3.2 Success indicators for audience engagement (Nigeria) 
Audience group Success indicators (how do we know if/to what extent we were 
successful?) 
Expect-to-
see 
Like-to-see Love-to-see 
Federal government and 
political elites 
 
Including: 
Ruling People’s 
Democratic Party and 
Action Congress of 
Nigeria – opposition party; 
Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation; 
Independent Election 
Commission  
Formal 
participation 
in roundtable 
 
Read the 
output with 
some degree 
of interest  
Follow-up on the 
materials outside of 
the roundtable on the 
issues being dealt 
with. 
 
Critical engagement 
with the outcome of 
the products. 
  
Active use of case study 
products (e.g. brief) and 
network building during 
roundtable. 
 
Reflect seriously upon the 
policy options that are 
contained in the outputs – 
particularly in the view of how 
governance can be 
strengthened at the federal, 
regional and local level. 
 
Early and transparent 
preparation for the 2015 polls; 
sending committed and clear 
messages that polls will be held 
in accordance with electoral 
laws. 
 
Commitment measured 
through: interventions to reduce 
youth employment; 
reintegration of fighters; 
enhancement of social services 
in Niger Delta. 
 
Federal government takes 
seriously the root causes that 
have spurred violence in the 
Niger Delta; and shows 
commitment to tackling 
organised crime and corruption. 
State-level governments 
and political elites in the 
Niger Delta 
 
(People’s Democratic 
Party) 
Formal 
participation 
in roundtable 
Read the 
output with 
some degree 
of interest 
 
Action: open 
dialogue  about the 
issues raised within 
the roundtable and 
the key messages of 
the research. 
  
Evidence of new and 
progressive voices included in 
policy discussions about use of 
oil revenue.  
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Local governments and 
community leaders in the 
Niger Delta 
Formal 
participation 
in roundtable 
 
Read the 
output with 
some degree 
of interest 
Action: recognition of 
the need to seek and 
include other 
stakeholders in the 
Delta political 
process. 
 
 
More inclusive and democratic 
processes evidenced by the 
emergence of new and 
progressive voices (political 
participation [in local elections]).  
Domestic/Delta-based 
former militant leaders 
 
Formal 
participation 
in roundtable 
 
Read the 
output with 
some degree 
of interest 
Much more 
constructive role in 
the reintegration 
process of former 
fighters. 
 
A positive contribution to the 
strengthening of governance: 
regional and local as a result of 
connections. 
Multinational oil 
companies 
Read the 
output with 
some degree 
of interest 
Critical engagement 
with the outcome of 
the products. 
  
Evidence of improved 
relationships with local 
communities re: community 
development and local security 
arrangements. Results in 
empowered local leadership 
(e.g. formalised local groups in 
dialogue with the oil majors) 
and de-escalation of violence at 
the local level. 
Delta CSOs 
 
Examples: Centre for 
Environment, Human 
Rights and Development; 
FOSTER  
Advocacy with 
case study 
products in 
hand 
Dissemination of 
case study outputs to 
several other CSOs 
and either strongly 
supportive or 
powerful key 
stakeholders. 
Use of the material 
(Brief) in own writing 
and reference (within 
a newspaper article 
or blog post) . 
CSO not directly involved 
actively uses products for 
advocacy and bridge-building 
with other CSOs and groups, 
particularly either strongly 
supportive or very powerful 
groups. 
INGOs/regional bodies/ 
networks active on Niger 
Delta affairs 
 
Examples: Democratic 
Stakeholders Network; 
Open Society Initiative for 
West Africa; Revenue 
Watch; Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung  
Advocacy with 
case study 
products in 
hand 
Outputs used within 
actors own policy 
analysis. 
 
The material (Brief) 
is used in actors’ 
own writing or 
referred to in a 
newspaper article 
and/or blog post. 
 
  
Outputs used within actors’ own 
networks and distributed within 
other powerful networks.  
Donors – particularly 
DFID 
Formal 
participation 
in roundtable 
 
Critical engagement 
with the outcome of 
the products. 
 
See evidence of outputs in 
future policy and programming 
on these issues (citations, 
references, etc.). 
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3.1.2 Sierra Leone case study 
Background 
From 1991 until 2002, Sierra Leone suffered a devastating civil war in which the civilian 
population suffered grave atrocities and infrastructure, including health and education, 
collapsed. In 2001, UN forces moved into rebel-held areas and began to disarm fighters. By 
January 2002, the war was declared over. Sierra Leone is viewed and described as a 
success story in terms of peace-building. However, the country remains one of the last on 
the Human Development Index and there remain significant internal threats to stability and 
peace, including wider structural issues linked to youth marginalisation and unemployment. 
 
The current political settlement, involving political elites, traditional leaders, donors and 
multinational companies, is articulated around a political economy of diamonds and mining. 
The political settlement is maintained through the remobilisation of former combatants – 
affiliated directly or indirectly to parent political organisations – in electoral ‘task forces’ or 
‘squads’ to mobilise voters and intimidate opponents through violence during election 
periods. 
 
Forms of violence in Sierra Leone encompass gender-based violence, gang violence, violent 
property disputes, resource and labour conflicts, cross-border violence and political violence. 
This work builds on an existing evidence base on these forms of violence to better 
understand how core state functions can be strengthened to mitigate and prevent different 
manifestations of violence. In particular the work focuses on youth marginalisation. 
 
Youth in Sierra Leone question redistributive benefits in relation to the current political 
settlement and have contested it through violent and non-violent means. The concerns of 
young people closely relate to land rights and what they consider to be their personal rights 
to dispose of property at the expense of older practices that subject property to the dictates 
and interests of ‘customary authorities’ that many view as corrupt. The radicalisation of youth 
– evident also in urban areas through the emergence of gangs in schools, universities and 
linked to music labels – shows how all these different levels of violence connect to political 
manipulation and economic disparities. 
 
Ideal situation 
In an ideal future violence is prevented (as opposed to mitigated) through an inclusive 
political settlement which enables equitable access to land by all citizens in the rural areas 
and promotes employment, training and education for all youth (not just ex-combatants) with 
a view to creating an economically stable and peaceful society. The Sierra Leone 
government is engaged with the CSOs and the youth of the country, listening and 
responding to the issues and experiences of the reality on the ground. Governmental and 
external flows of finance, policy or programming for violence prevention are responsive to 
the voice, needs and knowledge held by CSOs and citizens (as opposed to being driven by 
external agendas). 
 
The work on violence prevention/mitigation in Sierra Leone is timely and relevant because 1) 
the UNIPSIL is developing an exit strategy on the basis of the recent 2012 elections, which 
were deemed to be successful; and 2) Sierra Leone has recently been re-categorised as a 
Low Income Country (LIC) rather than a post-conflict country. It is unclear whether/how this 
recategorisation will affect aid priorities and strategies for the country, which since the end of 
the war have been geared to build peace. Thus, there is a need to assess Sierra Leone’s 
continuing transition, in order not only to prevent a relapse of widespread conflict but also to 
address newer forms of violence that have arisen. 
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Changes (in practice, knowledge, attitude, skill, policy) that contribute towards 
achieving project vision 
 
1. Dialogue is initiated between stakeholders and there is an ability to make 
connections between the transition to LIC and the UNIPSIL exit and the continuing 
need to engage with emerging and new forms of violence, in particular those 
connected to youth marginalisation, unemployment and landlessness. 
 
2. CSOs must take some form of ownership and play a key role in influencing the 
transition process from a heavily donor-influenced agenda to one which is more 
locally owned and responsive to the needs of citizens and in particular, youth. 
 
3. In the absence of external programmes, civil society and national government 
increasingly take responsibility for violence prevention and integrate this work into 
their existing and ongoing programmes. 
 
4. Donor awareness is increased of the need to continue the work on violence 
prevention through funding locally owned violence prevention strategies. 
 
Table 3.3 Target audience, desired change and channels of influence (SL) 
 
Audience group Changes 
needed 
(1–4 
above) 
Project strategy (how 
are actors 
involved/mobilised?) 
Output (in 
line with 
information 
needs) 
Events, 
opportunities and 
dissemination 
channels 
Donors in-country 
e.g. DFID, World 
Bank Social Fund, 
IDB, (and other 
donors contributing 
to multi-donor trust 
fund) 
1 and 4 A number of donors 
were invited to the 
roundtable. 
Summary 
Brief 
 
 
Blog on 
roundtable 
and output 
(with full report 
links) 
Direct mailing with 
cover letter from 
CCYA and IDS 
Via international 
Web 2.0 networks 
e.g. Eldis. 
Multilaterals, 
UNDP, UNIFEM, 
UN Integrated 
Peace Mission, 
UNICEF, etc. 
1 A number of 
multilaterals were 
invited to the 
roundtable. 
Summary 
Brief 
Direct mailing with 
cover letter from 
CCYA and IDS. 
National ministries 
incl. MoYouth, 
Employment and 
Sort, National Aids 
Secretariat, Office 
of National 
Security, National 
Youth Commission 
(NYC) 
1 and 3 A number of 
government officials 
were invited to the 
roundtable. 
Summary 
Brief 
Direct mailing with 
cover letter from 
CCYA+IDS. 
Follow-up on 
roundtable by 
CCYA with 
organisational 
contacts in NYC. 
Police community 
relations 
3 Police CR were invited 
to the roundtable. 
Summary 
Brief 
Direct mailing to 
roundtable 
participants and 
invitees. 
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SL civil society: 
governance and 
conflict resolution 
focus e.g. Centre 
for Good 
Governance 
(CGG), Non-State 
Actors (NSA) non-
violence platform 
1, 2 and 3 Civil society 
representatives invited 
to roundtable. 
 
Direct engagement 
with CGG as 
roundtable mediator. 
Summary 
Brief 
 
 
 
Blog on 
roundtable 
and on output 
(with full report 
links) 
 
Press Release 
Direct mailing to 
roundtable 
participants and 
invitees. 
IDS partner – CCYA 
– is a member of 
the NSA network, 
can use this as a 
dissemination 
channel. 
SL civil society: 
youth engagement 
and development 
agenda 
1, 2 and 3 Civil society 
representatives invited 
to roundtable. 
 
Direct engagement at 
roundtable through 
CSO presentations. 
 
Case study partner is 
CCYA. 
Summary 
Brief 
 
 
Blog on 
roundtable 
and on output 
(with full report 
links) 
 
Press Release 
Direct mailing to 
roundtable 
participants and 
invitees. 
 
Partner CCYA 
utilise networks to 
disseminate blog. 
SL country offices 
of INGO: Restless 
Development, Save 
the Children, Action 
Aid, SFCG, World 
Vision, Concern, 
IBIS 
 
1, 4 A number of INGOs 
were invited to the 
roundtable. 
Summary 
Brief 
 
 
 
Blog on 
roundtable 
and on output 
(with full report 
links) 
Direct mailing to 
roundtable 
participants and 
invitees. 
 
Via International 
Web 2.0 networks, 
e.g. Eldis. 
Academia in SL 1 Members of the 
academe were invited 
to the roundtable. 
Summary 
Brief 
Full report 
 
 
Blog on output 
Direct mailing of 
summary with letter 
highlighting e-links 
to full report. 
Via International 
W2.0 networks, e.g. 
Eldis. 
Regional civil 
society groups e.g. 
OSIWA 
1 and 4 Identified as 
stakeholders. 
Summary 
Brief 
 
Blog on 
roundtable 
and on output 
(with full report 
links) 
Direct mailing from 
IDS+CCYA. 
Via International 
Web 2.0 networks, 
e.g. Eldis. 
Media in SL 1 Identified as 
stakeholders. 
Press release 
with summary 
brief and links 
to e-report 
Press Release with 
cover letter from 
CCYA. 
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Table 3.4 Success indicators for audience engagement (SL) 
Audience 
group 
Success indicators (how do we know if/ to what extent we were successful) 
Expect-to-see Like-to-see Love-to-see 
Donors in-
country e.g. 
DFID, World 
Bank Social 
Fund, AFB, 
IDB, (and 
other donors 
contributing 
to multi-donor 
trust fund) 
Donors are present at the 
roundtables. 
 
Actors read the summary 
brief and share amongst 
staff. 
Donors engage in 
dialogue with local 
actors – particularly 
CSOs. 
 
Evidence of openness 
and public dissemination 
of information regarding 
their role in violence 
mitigation strategies in 
SL. 
Increased funding of new CSO 
programmes of work on violence 
prevention. 
 
Violence mitigation strategies 
are part of the country-office 
budget. 
Multilaterals; 
UNDP, 
UNIFEM, UN 
Integrated 
Peace 
Mission, 
UNICEF, etc. 
Actors are present at the 
roundtable. 
 
Actors read the summary 
brief and share amongst 
staff. 
An enhancement of the 
existing channels 
between the programme 
staff and the UN 
(concrete engagement 
over the exit strategy for 
UNIPSIL). 
Official discussion takes place 
with the national government 
and other donors. 
National 
ministries 
incl. MoYES, 
NAS, ONS 
Actors are present at the 
roundtable. 
 
Actors read the summary 
brief and share amongst 
staff.  
Actors have some form 
of engagement with the 
brief (critical; citations). 
 
Actors make links with 
CSOs (working groups) 
and they construct a 
dialogue. 
 
National ownership increases in 
terms of conflict prevention 
(effect on livelihoods and 
inclusion). 
 
Programme design touches 
upon the issues – attribution 
because the baseline is 
currently at zero. 
Police 
community 
relations 
Actors are present at the 
roundtable. 
 
Actors read the summary 
brief. 
New information is fed 
back to the public by the 
police – widening 
access to information 
regarding violence. 
 
Working groups form 
with CSOs to tackle the 
issues together. 
Youth marginalisation and 
violence is better reflected in 
policy discussions in these 
target areas. 
SL civil 
society: 
governance 
and conflict 
resolution 
focus e.g. 
CGG, NSA 
Platform 
Actor present at the 
roundtable. 
 
Actors read and share 
the summary brief. 
Increased awareness of 
the topic and a follow-up 
workshop. 
 
Working groups form 
with national 
government 
organisations to tackle 
the issues together. 
Actor continues to organise 
meetings as a means to access 
more powerful actors. 
SL civil 
society: youth 
Actor present at the 
roundtable. 
Working groups form 
with national 
Actor organises meetings as a 
means to access more powerful 
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3.2 Sub-theme 2 
Improving access to livelihoods, jobs and basic services in violent context – including in 
large urban settings. Expanding access to services, and economic opportunities for the poor. 
 
3.2.1 Nairobi case study 
Background 
Insecurity is an endemic phenomenon in Nairobi with complex social and political 
characteristics. Different forms of violence include murders, rape, kidnappings and 
carjacking by criminal gangs, assassinations and reprisal attacks associated with political 
and commercial interests, vigilantism and mob justice, extra-judicial killings, and small-scale 
‘terrorist’ attacks by extremists. These various forms of violence are testament to the 
extreme inequalities that characterise everyday life in Nairobi and failures to provide 
adequate security and safety for the poor. Rent-seeking and protection rackets are 
commonplace in many poor neighbourhoods of the city, where informal structures and 
processes involving a variety of non-state actors are the important providers of ‘security’ and 
engagement 
and 
development 
agenda 
Actors read and share 
the summary brief. 
government 
organisations to tackle 
the issues together. 
actors. 
SL country 
offices of 
INGO: 
Restless 
Development, 
Save the 
Children, 
Action Aid, 
SFCG, World 
Vision, 
Concern, 
IBIS 
 
Actor present at the 
roundtable. 
 
Actors read the summary 
brief. 
Relay the report on their 
website (evidence of 
further dissemination). 
INGO has new programmes that 
address new forms of violence 
because current donor 
programmes are fairly limited 
(participation in the planning 
process). 
Academia in 
SL 
Academics are present at 
the roundtable. 
 
Actors read and share 
the summary brief. 
Engaged: direct 
involvement in 
addressing new forms of 
violence through 
programmes. 
 
Academics share the 
information within other 
networks. 
 
Academics are better equipped 
to consider the security 
environment in SL: facilitation 
between multilaterals (funders 
and donors and government) on 
topic – policymaking bodies. 
Regional civil 
society 
groups e.g. 
OSIWA 
Engages with SL civil 
society. 
Attends future 
workshops, events. 
Funds specific programmes 
Media in SL Runs a story on the 
issues. 
Investigates further 
through follow-up with 
CCYA; links story to the 
UNIPSIL coverage. 
Does a series of grassroots 
interviews with youth on these 
issues. 
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other public services. Neglect of the urban poor in the provision of basic services has 
allowed illegal non-state groups to proliferate and exercise a growing predatory control over 
the poor. Even in cases of dispute settlement, the poor have limited recourse to formal 
redress mechanisms and often have to rely on private violence to enforce their claims and 
rights. 
 
Deeper problems that contribute to the proliferation of non-state violent groups and 
insecurity in Nairobi include high levels of unemployment amongst the youth, exploitation by 
political and business elites, and the failure of national and local authorities to provide basic 
services in poor areas of the city. The provision of public goods and services and 
strengthening of access to economic opportunities for an expanding youth population are 
vital elements of a wider-ranging strategy to address violence and strengthen security for the 
urban poor in Nairobi. The report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence as 
well as policy statements by senior Kenyan government officials have also pointed to better 
service delivery and access to economic opportunities as essential elements of a strategy to 
reduce violence. Yet violence in poor neighbourhoods tends to be treated as a narrow 
policing problem and law and order issue, even though the police are reviled and widely 
seen as contributing to everyday insecurities that affect the poor, such as through 
harassment, arbitrary stop and searches and seeking bribes from public transport operators. 
 
Ideal situation 
 Reduction in violence affecting poor urban neighbourhoods. 
 Delivery of reliable basic services for the urban poor by the state and non-state 
(legal) partners. 
 Greater access to work and economic opportunities for the urban poor, and 
particularly young people. 
 Opportunities for innovative community and state approaches for providing 
services/public security are promoted. 
 Fewer opportunities for illegal groups to prey on the urban poor. 
 Policy stakeholders at multiple levels of government and in different sectors work in a 
coordinated fashion to address violence. 
 
Changes (in practice, knowledge, attitude, skill, policy) that contribute towards achieving 
project vision 
Ensure that the outputs are widely disseminated through all available networks and IDS 
channels for maximum effect, in order to: 
 
1. Increase awareness of the linkages between youth unemployment, inadequate public 
services (specifically electricity, water and sanitation) and organised crime and 
violence. 
2. Encourage a desire for coordinating efforts between key actors (across different 
sectors) and improve their understanding of why previous coordinated efforts aimed 
at resolving these problems have not worked in the past. 
3. Challenge attitudes around ‘slums’ not being part of the city. 
4. Share successful examples of technical innovations and the development of youth 
opportunities. 
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Table 3.5 Target audience, desired change and channels of influence 
(Nairobi) 
 
Audience 
group 
Changes 
needed 
(1–4 
above) 
Project strategy (how 
are actors 
involved/mobilised?) 
Output (in line 
with information 
needs) 
Events, opportunities 
and dissemination 
channels 
Central and 
local 
government 
1, 2, and 3  
Invited to participate in 
roundtable 
 
Receive and share 
project outputs 
(Mar/Apr 2013) 
 
Main report and 
Summary Brief 
 
Editorial 
collaboration 
(media) 
Direct mail to partner 
contacts. 
 
Kenyan media. 
Civil society  1, 2, and 3 Summary Brief 
Audio slideshow 
Through partner 
networks and their 
contacts. 
Community 
groups and 
activists 
1, 2 and 4 Summary Brief 
Audio slideshow 
Direct mail to partner 
contacts. 
Kenya 
National 
Police 
1, 2, 3 and 
4 
Ongoing meetings 
between researchers 
and key police officers 
(already working with 
them on another 
project) 
Summary Brief 
 
 
Editorial 
collaboration 
(media) 
Via regular ongoing 
meetings 
 
Kenyan media 
Private 
sector 
(electricity 
and water 
companies) 
1, 2, 3 and 
4 
Partner contacts have 
good working 
relationships with 
Kenya Power, Lighting 
Company & Nairobi 
Water and Sewerage 
Co 
Summary Brief 
 
Audio slideshow 
 
Meetings set up via 
Umande and Pamoja 
Trust (who have 
contacts in these 
companies). 
Donors/ 
researchers 
engaged in 
urban 
Kenya – in-
country 
1 and 4 Partner has contacts 
with UNHabitat; 
USAID represented at 
roundtable; IDS has 
contacts with DFID 
and FCO Horn of 
Africa 
Blogs and social 
media 
 
Main report and 
summary brief 
Organise a 1-to-1 
consultation to 
investigate how 
research fits in with 
their thinking. 
Donors/ 
researchers 
engaged in 
urban 
Kenya – 
international 
1 and 4 IDS has contacts with 
DFID Fragile States, 
European 
Commission, Chatham 
House, Rift Valley 
Inst., Royal Africa 
Society and UNDP  
Blogs and social 
media 
 
Audio slideshow 
 
Main report and 
summary brief 
IDS channels (email 
lists, website, social 
media channels) 
DFID channels (e.g. 
R4D). Other channels 
(e.g. African 
Arguments blog hosted 
by Royal African 
Society). 
Media (e.g. AllAfrica). 
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Table 3.6 Success indicators for audience engagement (Nairobi) 
Audience 
group 
Success indicators (how do we know if/to what extent we were successful?) 
Expect-to-see Like-to-see Love-to-see 
Central and 
local 
government 
Participate in 
roundtable and read 
the summary briefs 
Officials read the full 
report and critically 
reflect on its 
recommended actions. 
 
Officials are available for 
follow-up formal and 
informal discussions. 
 
Active use of case study 
products (e.g. brief) and 
network building during 
roundtable. 
 
Renewed will and 
commitment to implement 
coordinated efforts to improve 
security for the urban poor 
through more widely available 
public goods and services as 
well as training and work 
opportunities, particularly for 
young people. 
Civil society  Representatives 
participate in 
roundtable and read 
the summary brief 
 
Advocacy using policy 
analysis 
 
Civil society officials 
consulted during project 
use the analysis to 
instigate new 
discussions amongst 
wider spectrum of civil 
society stakeholders. 
 
National civil society 
actors in Kenya become 
more conversant in 
policy discussions on 
addressing violence and 
policing matters. 
 
Effective civil society 
engagement with government 
and policy stakeholders 
involved in addressing 
violence in poor 
neighbourhoods. 
 
More regular consultations 
and knowledge sharing 
between community 
organisations, government 
officials, and representatives 
of utility companies. 
Community 
groups and 
activists 
Participate in 
roundtable as well as 
neighbourhood-level 
consultations to verify 
policy understandings 
and proposed actions 
to address violence 
 
 
Use policy analysis to 
leverage innovative local 
responses, such as 
through invitations to 
relevant meetings and 
new contacts with 
political–administrative 
officials and 
representatives of utility 
companies. 
 
Evidence in the form of 
policies and investments that 
promote innovative 
responses by community 
organisations. 
 
More regular consultations 
and knowledge sharing 
between community 
organisations, government 
officials, and representatives 
utility companies. 
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Kenya National 
Police 
Representatives 
participate in 
roundtable and read 
the summary brief 
 
Critical engagement with 
the outcome of the 
products. 
 
Greater official 
understanding of the 
connections between 
violence and wider 
problems of youth 
unemployment and poor 
service provision. 
 
Attitudes have changed 
around ‘slums not being part 
of the city’ as a result of 
attending roundtable, reading 
project outputs and ongoing 
engagement with partners. 
 
Evidence of willingness to be 
involved in joined-up efforts to 
address violence in poor 
neighbourhoods. 
 
 
Private sector 
(electricity and 
water 
companies) 
Representatives 
participate in 
roundtable and read 
the summary brief 
 
Critical engagement with 
the outcome of the 
products. 
 
 
Attitudes have changed 
around ‘slums not being part 
of the city’ as a result of 
reading project outputs and 
ongoing engagement with 
partners. 
 
Evidence of efforts to develop 
new approaches to extend 
services in poor 
neighbourhoods. 
 
 
Donors  Participate in 
roundtable and read 
the summary brief 
 
Critical engagement with 
the summary brief and 
full report. 
New programming drawing 
on findings of policy analysis, 
particularly including support 
for innovative local-level 
initiatives in Nairobi’s poor 
urban areas. 
 
Policy analysts 
and scholars 
working in/on 
urban wellbeing 
and violence  
Participate in 
roundtable and read 
the summary brief 
 
 
The material (briefing) is 
used in actors’ own 
writing or referred to in a 
newspaper article and/or 
blog post. 
Outputs used within specialist 
networks focusing on delivery 
of services and/or provision of 
security in urban areas, as 
well as distributed to wider 
policy networks on 
addressing violence. 
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3.2.2 Maharashtra (including Mumbai) case study 
Background 
In India, the state of Maharashtra currently has the largest number of urban Indians, 50.8 
million, while Mumbai, its capital, is predicted to become the third most populous city in the 
world with 25.8 million inhabitants. Many poor people in urban India are cut off from service 
delivery such as safe water, electricity, garbage disposal, drain clearance and so on. As a 
result, a large proportion of the population live in overcrowded spaces, with poor housing 
conditions, and are subject to diseases and environmental hazards. The poor are also 
denied access to education and health. Inadequate employment or under-employment are 
equally widespread and are a cause for concern as Indian families massively invested in the 
education of their children – thus creating a large feeling of relative deprivation. 
 
It is important to recognise that urban impoverished areas in India also tend to be sites which 
are consistently afflicted by outbreaks of civil violence, and in this, Maharashtra has become 
one of the states most affected by this violence. Whilst rioting has fallen consistently since 
the 1990s across India, Maharashtra stands as an exception, currently experiencing 
approximately 6,000 riots per year, spread across the state. 
 
Violence-prone neighbourhoods suffer acutely from widespread vulnerability and a lack of 
access to services. Because the state fails to distribute public goods and services in poor 
areas, these are provided largely on informal and extra-legal platforms and so are likely to 
exclude the poorest. Yet the sort of platforms that operate and distribute resources has been 
shown to directly impact the likelihood and extent of civil violence, as some of the actors 
involved take an active part in ‘institutionalised riot systems’. 
 
Although riots predominantly happen in impoverished urban areas, there is a lack of 
understanding of the linkages between civil violence and vulnerabilities, both in terms of 
policy and research. At best, the efforts to improve the security of vulnerable urban 
populations include physical insecurity at the margin (focusing on social, economic or legal 
insecurity), whereas law and order agencies fail to encompass violence in their broader 
social and economic contexts. 
  
Yet the impacts of the processes of urbanisation (such as compulsory land acquisitions and 
mass slum relocation programmes) on the physical vulnerabilities of evictees are not well 
known. In particular, how the experience of eviction relates to the physicality of urban 
vulnerability (including risk of injury or death, exposure to crime, violence, fear, and the lack 
of protection by and from the law) is not well documented. This gap is likely to exert adverse 
consequences on policy as recent research on informal settlements has shown that the 
urban poor often have to step outside the law in order to gain access to land and housing so 
that primary illegality becomes the source of several other, mostly negative, encounters with 
law enforcement agencies. 
 
Ideal situation 
The ideal situation would be one where citizens in low-income urban areas have the ability to 
reach out to municipal and neighbourhood-level civil society institutions to strengthen safety 
and security. In this context the slum panchayat model is the primary ‘neighbourhood-level’ 
institution and the conduit for community concerns/demands. ‘Panchayati Raj’ is a 
decentralised form of governance in South Asia where each village is responsible for its own 
affairs. The urban form in slum areas – and a much newer initiative – is ergo dubbed ‘slum 
panchayat’. 
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Ideally, safety goals would originate from slum dwellers themselves, and as such 
encompass all relevant types of violence and insecurity that people face. Different 
stakeholders would respond to these in an accountable manner, and with the active 
participation of the citizens. 
  
Further, the interdependence between poverty/vulnerability on the one hand, and safety on 
the other hand, would be acknowledged by both development and security actors, thereby 
exploiting previously untapped areas of cross-intervention, and preventing problematic 
approaches to either. As an example of the former, enhancing service provision can be done 
in a way that both meet the needs of the people but also reduce tensions between 
households, communities or even within households that may arise from a lack (and/or 
unequal) access to key resources. Youth employment is another case in point. As an 
example of the latter, aggressive policies of slum upgrading or slum relocations, enacted 
without citizen participation have the potential to both undermine welfare as well as create 
tensions and increase the potential for violence. 
 
In sum, in the ideal situation, the evaluation of safety issues would not be left to the appraisal 
of 
external actors alone, and interventions would take place before tensions erupt into major 
bouts of violence. The links between violence and development goals would be 
acknowledged and exploited for policymaking. Policymakers would be both more apt to work 
together across remits and with the population. 
 
Changes (in practice, knowledge, attitude, skill, policy) that contribute towards 
achieving project vision 
 
1. Recognise the potential of slum Panchayats to be effective local community actors, 
that is, a conduit for state (police) collaboration. This model has been piloted in 
several neighbourhoods, so the change we would be looking to support/foster is its 
recognition in neighbourhoods/informal settlements where it has not yet been 
implemented. 
 
2. Understand strong linkages between security (crime) and development – and new 
linkages between crime and riots. 
 
3. Appreciate the extent and nature of insecurity in the slums – policies/state 
interventions have not recognised the fluid/changing nature of insecurity, nor that 
variability in urban insecurity (high degree of variation longitudinally and spatially). 
 
4. Recognise the need to generate new evidence for effective policy formulation on two 
specific areas – the effect of slum upgrading (and relocation) on physical insecurity; 
and the linkages between civil violence and vulnerabilities (riots predominantly 
happen in impoverished urban areas). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 3.7 Target audiences, desired change and influencing channel 
(India)  
 
 
 
Audience 
group 
Changes 
needed 
(1–4 
above) 
Project strategy (how 
are actors 
involved/mobilised?) 
Output (in 
line with 
information 
needs) 
Events, opportunities and 
dissemination channels 
Police 
 
1, 2, and 
3 
Invited to participate in 
roundtable 
 
Receive and share 
project outputs 
(Mar/Apr 2013) 
 
Also: 
 follow up in-depth 
interview with DGP 
Anami Roy on 
Slum Panchayat 
 subsequent police 
training workshops 
to be run by 
SNEHA – local 
partner 
Summary 
Brief 
Direct mail to named officers 
 MCMT Trustees 
(retired heads of 
police) 
 Police Commissioners 
Office 
 
Current initiative to get 
Government Recommendation 
(GR) – aim to feed research 
findings into this process 
Slum Dwellers 
Panchayat/ 
Slum Dwellers 
Federation 
3 Roundtable briefing 
and summary of 
research findings have 
been developed into a 
booklet and given to 
Slum Panchayat 
leadership. 
 
Invited to participate in 
roundtable. 
 
 
Receive and share 
project outputs 
(Mar/Apr 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Community 
film  
 
Community film screening 
Media 1, 2, and 
3 
Press release 
–Local 
translation 
 
 
Indian Civil 
Society – 
(NGOs 
working with 
police, etc.) 
1, 2, and 
3 
Summary 
Brief 
Blog 
Community 
film 
Through partner networks and 
their contacts 
 
State 
government 
1, 2, and 
3 
Summary 
Brief 
Direct mail to named officers 
Donors/ 
researchers 
(both national, 
international) 
engaged in 
urban India 
1, 2, 3 
and 4 
Main Report 
Summary 
Brief 
Blog  
Utilise IDS and partner 
personal contacts.  
IDS Blog, Eldis channels 
DFID channels (e.g. R4D) 
Other channels (e.g. African 
Arguments blog hosted by 
Royal African Society) 
Media (e.g. AllAfrica). 
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Table 3.8 Success indicators for audience engagement (India) 
Audience group 
 
Primary audience 
Success indicators (how do we know if/ o what extent we were successful?) 
Expect-to-see 
Access to 
outputs 
 
Like-to-see 
(dialogue) Some form of 
uptake – but not by the 
government 
 
Love-to-see 
Government recommendation 
on paper – or other most 
powerful actors using the 
outputs 
Police 
Specifically: 
 MCMT Trustees 
(retired heads 
of police) 
 Police 
Commissioners 
Officers 
 
 
 
Actors have 
access to outputs 
(number of actors 
at the roundtable). 
A dialogue is started 
between the police and the 
Panchayats. 
A dialogue is started between 
the police and the Panchayats 
that directly influences policy 
methods and existing practices. 
 
Police use the briefs produced 
as a result of the roundtable. 
 
[Conflict resolution strategies are 
discussed – not necessarily 
legalised – but recommended as 
a result of the dialogue at the 
round table]. 
Media 
Specifically: 
 beat journalists 
 opinion editors 
 crime desk 
 
Actors have 
access to outputs 
(number of actors 
at the roundtable). 
 
Media outputs 
(stories) are made 
accessible in an 
increased number 
of languages.  
Media outputs (stories) are 
published by journalists – or 
used – in local media 
houses. 
 
(Direct i.e. have contacts) 
Media outputs affect the prestige 
or reach of the newspaper outlet 
(increased readership of the 
newspaper). 
 
Journalistic practices change 
amongst actors as a result of 
output. 
 
(Indirect i.e. through 
intermediary). 
 
Slum Panchayats 
(informal/ formal) 
 
Slum Dwellers 
Federation (NSDF) 
 
 
Actors have 
access to the 
outputs (number of 
actors at the 
roundtable). 
 
A DVD is 
produced and 
made accessible 
to actors (number 
of DVDs 
distributed). 
 
 
 
An action that was 
otherwise unlikely to take 
place occurs as a result of 
the DVD (measured through 
attribution questions). 
 
AND/OR 
 
Actors are mobilised as a 
result of the DVD or 
roundtable discussion (a 
visible action that was 
otherwise unlikely to take 
place can be seen). 
An action occurs as a result of 
your DVD (otherwise unlikely to 
occur) and is presented in the 
national media; discussed 
amongst the police; or other 
influential actors (measured 
through attribution questions 
with pre-defined influential 
actors). 
 
AND/OR 
 
Actors are mobilised, and this 
influences additional/existing 
political narratives (measures 
through instances mentioned in 
media; local government).  
 
Advocacy 
organisations on 
Actors 
(researchers) have 
access to 
A secondary ‘output’ occurs 
by actors with access to the 
outputs or who were 
otherwise unlikely to act 
The government use the findings 
from the academic outputs 
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urban planning 
(SPARC CSO) 
academic outputs. 
 
Actors have 
access to the 
outputs (DVD). 
 
The number of 
channels to alert 
actors to outputs 
increases. 
(monitoring the qualitative 
increase in political rallies; 
subsequent gathering; 
protest). 
Actors are mobilised, and this 
influences additional/existing 
political narratives (measures 
through instances mentioned in 
media; local government). 
NGOs working with 
police (SNEHA) 
Actors have 
access to the 
outputs. 
Actors use/reference 
outputs as part of training 
material. 
IDS team is directly involved in 
planning/formulating police 
trainings. 
State government 
Specifically: 
 State Home 
Minister’s 
Office 
 Municipal 
Commissioner 
Office 
 Local 
Corporators 
 
Actors have 
access to the 
briefs (qualitative 
affirmation). 
 
Invitations are sent 
to an increased 
number of/a 
qualitative 
important selection 
of offices for 
National 
Municipalities. 
 
Actors come to the 
roundtable . 
A dialogue starts between 
actors and researchers 
(evidence that actors have 
made time to engage with 
briefs). 
 
New dimensions of conflict 
resolution are discussed; 
specifically Slum Panchayats are 
recommended as a conduit 
between state and citizen – not 
necessarily a legitimising action.  
Donors (interested 
in topic): 
IDRC, DFID 
International 
researchers 
 
 
Donors/ 
international 
researchers 
have access to 
outputs (briefs). 
 
 
 Donors/international 
researchers download briefs 
from the IDS website / 
request the output directly. 
 
Uptake – commissioned 
evaluations/written terms of 
reference/approaches to the 
problem change as a result of 
research outputs (citations). 
Funding of the programme 
increases. 
Secondary 
audience 
Access to 
materials through 
other sources. 
Framing question: 
Can we find traces 
of our work in what 
it is that the actors 
do? 
Other actors are sent the 
outputs (reports, briefs) 
directly by our immediate 
boundary partners. 
 
 
 
Feedback mechanism: other 
actors are influenced as a result 
of our outputs, which trigger 
processes of accountability and 
learning. 
 
National research 
organisations 
Specifically: 
Institute for Conflict 
Management, 
Delhi. 
Tata Institute for 
Social Sciences. 
BU – NIAS. 
Aware research is 
happening. 
 
Access materials. 
 
 
Engage with the material. 
 
Find traces of research 
outputs in their work (cited). 
 
 
 
Directly build on project’s 
research. 
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3.3 Forthcoming work to be added for future ‘sentinel outputs’ 
Future outputs will be incorporated into this working document and will inform the approach 
of the uptake strategy as the programme progresses. Apart from case study reports and 
policy briefs the AMV theme will generate a wide range of other outputs including an impact 
evaluation, a summary report/typology, as well as blogs and other web content. These will 
require bespoke plans to promote the uptake of policy analysis and findings that are 
developed. 
 
Future outputs will build on work undertaken thus far, and allow us to present a coherent 
body of work in new and innovative ways. 
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4 Global dissemination plan 
Dissemination of theme outputs to a wider, global set of actors will allow access to, and 
uptake of, content by a range of users and potential ‘influencing targets’. 
 
The outputs will be available as PDF soft copies online on the IDS site, Open Docs 
repository and Eldis, with a dedicated static link (that links to the PDFs). Policy briefs will be 
printed and disseminated in hard copy. These different formats allow us to target different 
audiences using various means and are supplemented by the blogs, audio or visual products 
and news items prepared by the case study teams. 
 
As well as country-specific stakeholders there are common audiences across all case 
studies that will be targeted with products from across the theme. These include: 
 
 General networks: Policypointers; Relief Web. 
 Conflict and security networks: Peace and Collaborative Development Network; 
Global Consortium on Security Transformation; IANSA. 
 Specific conflict NGOs: International Alert; Saferworld; Small Arms Survey; Swiss 
Peace; Conciliation Resources; International Rescue Committee; Oxford Research 
Group; The Berghof Foundation; Peace Brigades International; Interpeace; Peace 
Direct. 
 Research/academic: CRISE; Crisis States Research Centre; McGill University; 
GSDRC; Institute for Public Policy Research; EU Institute for Security Studies; 
Geneva Centre for Security Studies; SIPRI. 
 Bilateral/multilateral: DFID (particularly the Fragile States and Conflict Team); 
USAID; Irish Aid; SDC; NORAD; IDRC; DANIDA; FINIDA; WHO (UN – AVVP 
programme); OECD-DAC; UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery; GIZ; UNRCPD; 
UNICEF. 
 Development agencies: Oxfam; ActionAid; Christian Aid; Quaker International 
 Philanthropic Foundations: Ford Foundation; McArthur; Rockefeller; Mott; 
Hewlett-Packard; Gates. 
 
 
In addition, IDS Central Communications has recently undertaken a number of targeted 
dissemination activities with outputs that explore conflict, security and violence themes. As 
such there are dedicated lists and established channels that can be exploited, for example: 
 
 policy actors in Brussels and Westminster; 
 NGO networks and groups (e.g. Bond conflict policy group); 
 key (conflict) academics and researchers; 
 active and influential civil society actors. 
 
This strong crossover with current IDS research outputs will enable us to cross-reference 
and promote this theme’s work and present a coherent body of evidence on particular issues 
and locales. We have also identified forthcoming work from IDS researchers where ongoing 
links and cross-referencing can be sustained e.g. a forthcoming Tomorrow Today report 
covering related issues in Sierra Leone and Kenya. 
 
Standard dissemination channels include: 
 
 Networks’ Listservs; regular e-newsletters and websites (overview and key 
messages and website link and/or PDF). 
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 Mail outs to donors, NGOs, academics. 
 Eldis, including the website; community site and Reporters. 
 Blogs e.g. IDS Governance blog; the IDS site and Eldis site and community groups; 
 Dissemination at events (workshops, conferences, etc.). 
 IDS channels, including Yellow Monday; main site; intranet; Twitter; research fellows. 
 DFID channels and website pages e.g. R4D. 
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5 Monitoring uptake and impact 
The Impact Innovation team were involved in the development of outcome indicators in the 
process of drawing up the uptake strategies at the country level. They will continue to 
engage with the theme by designing appropriate methods to capture and monitor the 
outcomes identified for the various audiences and to learn from the process in order to 
inform the future strategies developed for forthcoming products and cases. 
 
This will be complemented by data gathered through the monitoring process of the 
Accountable Grant more broadly, which will be in line with the log frame indicators 
developed for each theme. 
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